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Abstract
The Lehman Brothers court-appointed bankruptcy examiner produced a 2,200-page report
detailing possible claims that the estate might pursue. The most surprising revelation of the
report was that during its last year Lehman had relied heavily on an unusual financing
transaction—Repo 105. The examiner concluded that Lehman’s aggressive use of Repo 105
transactions enabled it to remove up to $50 billion of assets from its balance sheet at quarterend and to manipulate its leverage ratio so that it could report more favorable results. This
case considers in-depth Lehman’s questionable use of Repo 105 transactions and its impact.

_____________________________________________________________________
This case study is one of eight Yale Program on Financial Stability case modules considering the Lehman
Brothers Bankruptcy:
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1. Introduction
In mid-2007, Lehman Brothers faced a critical dilemma. As a result of the decline in the
subprime mortgage market and the related turmoil in the financial markets, particularly the
interbank lending markets, financial experts and the rating agencies were urging that
investment banks decrease their leverage
In November 2007, Lehman reported a leverage ratio of 30.7x (Lehman 2007). This ratio had
been 23.9x in 2004 (Ibid.) and had remained somewhat constant until 2006 when Lehman
adopted a more aggressive growth strategy. Lehman’s high-leverage, high-risk business
model was similar to that of its peers. However, Lehman held greater amounts of real estate
assets than some of it peers which worsened its risk profile as housing continued to stumble.
At the end of its 2007 fiscal year, Lehman Brothers held $111 billion in commercial or
residential real-estate-related assets and securities, more than double the $52 billion that it
held at the end of 2006, and more than four times its equity.
Lehman’s failure to reduce its leverage could result in a ratings downgrade, which would
have an immediate negative effect on its ability to borrow. As a result, in January 2008, the
firm instituted a deleveraging initiative—aiming to reduce its large positions in commercial
and residential real estate. However, it had difficulty selling these types of assets at
acceptable prices because the market had already begun to weaken. Also, Lehman was
reluctant to sell such assets at discounted prices. Not only would doing so risk Lehman taking
losses on the sold assets, but it would call into question the value of its remaining assets of
similar type and compel Lehman to mark them to market value, potentially recognizing
additional losses. Following the near collapse of Bear Stearns in March 2008 (in which
subprime mortgages were a key factor), things worsened and rumors circulated that Lehman
Brothers would be the next investment bank to go under. (FCIC 2011).Lehman began casting
around for a strategy that would secure the firm’s future and allay the market’s fears. As a
solution failed to crystalize, some parties began to minimize their dealings with the troubled
bank, including refusing to roll over their repurchase and resale (repo) financing, on which
Lehman was dependent for day-to-day operations. As Lehman responded to these pressures,
it turned to a particular type of repo transaction known as “Repo 105” to manage its balance
sheet and leverage ratio. Lehman accounted for Repo 105 transactions as “sales,” rather than
as “financings,” which enabled it to temporarily remove up to $50 billion of assets from its
balance sheet at quarter-end. Lehman also used the cash generated from Repo 105
transactions to pay off other liabilities, thereby reducing its net leverage ratio. It did not
disclose these acts to its board of directors or the public. Anton R. Valukas, the Lehman
bankruptcy examiner, later concluded that Lehman’s use of Repo 105 was solely for the
purpose of managing its books and manipulating its publicly reported financial information.
The balance of this case is organized as follows: Sections 2 and 3 provide, respectively,
detailed explanations of standard repo transactions and of Statement of Financial
Accounting Standard (SFAS) 140, which was the basis for Lehman’s Repo 105 transactions.
Section 4 describes Lehman’s interpretation of SFAS 140 and its design of Repo 105, while
Section 5 discusses in detail Lehman’s use of Repo 105. Section 6 reviews Lehman’s
disclosures. Section 7 considers additional impacts and risks that Repo 105 created for
Lehman, and Section 8 concludes by describing changes to formal and informal regulatory
standards prompted by the revelation of Repo 105.

Questions
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1. How do Repo 105 transactions differ from standard repo transactions?
2. Was Lehman’s analysis of SFAS 140 and its structuring of Repo 105 transactions
justifiable?
3. What were the economic, ethical, and legal impacts of Lehman’s use of Repo 105
transactions?
4. Did Lehman make proper disclosures in light of its use of Repo 105 transactions and
its obligations?

2. Standard Repo Transactions
In 2007, Lehman was a large and successful financial services provider that offered a wide
variety of sophisticated products and services to a vast range of global clients. The firm
aggressively pursued opportunities in proprietary trading, derivatives, securitization, asset
management, and real estate. Like most of its investment-banking peers, it employed a highly
leveraged business model that enabled the firm to maintain $691,063 million of assets on
just $22,490 million of stockholders’ equity (a leverage rate of 30.73) (Lehman 2007). (See
YPFS case study Wiggins et al. 2014A for more information regarding Lehman’s business.)
This business model also required Lehman to raise billions of dollars in funding each day just
to operate. Like most investment banks, it relied heavily on the unregulated short-term
wholesale funding of commercial paper loans and repos carried on by investment banks,
hedge funds and other institutional investors—the “shadow banking system”—and daily
borrowed billions of dollars through repo transactions to finance its operations.4
As Gorton and Metrick (2012) describe, a repo is a type of short-term debt instrument used
by investment banks and other financial institutions to finance their inventory positions. It
is essentially a short-term loan that is secured by collateral that the borrower delivers to the
lender. The borrower agrees to repurchase the collateral when it repays the loan. Standard
repo transactions are a key part of investment-bank financing and liquidity management.
A repurchase agreement embodies a two-part transaction as shown in Figure 1. In the first
part, a “depositor” (the “lender”) deposits cash at a bank (the “borrower”), such as Lehman.
The borrower will pay the lender interest on the cash (“repo rate”) as a fee for its use. To
guarantee the cash deposit, the bank transfers collateral to the lender in the form of
securities which the lender takes physical possession of. If the collateral delivered by the
borrower is discounted, the borrower is said to have paid a “haircut.” For example, if the
borrower delivers securities worth $102 million, but receives only $100 million cash in
return, it has paid approximately a 2% haircut. Although the depositor/lender takes
possession of the collateral, repos are structured so that the economic benefits of owning the
_____________________________________________________________________
The shadow banking system is the name given to the network of financial institutions (“shadow banks”) that
participate in financing activities outside of the federally regulated and insured banking system. This includes
hedge funds, investment banks, and money funds. Whereas depository banks insure liquidity through the
Federal Reserve System and federal deposit insurance, financial institutions in the shadow banking system gain
liquidity by offering assets as collateral for short-term borrowings from other institutions. Shadow banks loan
funds through a wide range of securitization and secured funding techniques such as asset-backed commercial
paper (ABCP), asset-backed securities (ABS), collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), and repurchase
agreements (repos). Although no official estimate is available, the size of this market has been estimated to be
between $10 and $16 trillion, or equal to, or in excess of, the U.S. commercial banking sector Gorton and Metrick
2012; Pozsar, et al., 2012).
4
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securities used as collateral (e.g., coupons paid, capital gains and losses) remain with the
original owner.
In the second part of the repo, the lender agrees to sell back the securities given as collateral
to the borrower at the end of the repo, and the borrower agrees to repurchase them at a price
equal to the amount of cash originally lent, plus the agreed-upon interest.
Figure 1: Ordinary Repo Flow Diagram

Source: Examiner’s Report, Vol. 3, 768.
Repos are typically short-term, with overnight repo being the most common, but repos can
be as long as one year. Many overnight repos are repeatedly rolled over, extending their
length well beyond their original term. If the borrower goes bankrupt, does not repay the
cash, or does not make the interest payment when due, then the lender can terminate the
repo agreement and sell the securities held as collateral.
Lehman accounted for a standard repo transaction as a loan or “financing” (i.e., a secured
borrowing) with the securities pledged as collateral remaining on the bank’s books. The
incoming borrowed cash was booked as an increase in the bank’s assets (borrowings). It also
booked the obligation to repay the cash (and repurchase the collateral) as an offsetting
liability. Thus, total assets remained unchanged by a standard repo.

3. SFAS 140 and Treating Repos as “Sales”
Statement of Financial Accounting Standard (SFAS) 140 took effect in September 2000 and
provided accounting and reporting standards for distinguishing transfers of financial assets
that are “sales” from transfers that are “financings.” Under SFAS 140, the transfer of financial
assets in which the transferor surrenders control of the assets should be accounted for as a
sale. Under SFAS 140, paragraph 9, the transferor is considered to have surrendered control
if, and only if, the following three conditions are met (paraphrased):
a) The transferred assets have been isolated from the transferor—put presumptively
beyond the reach of the transferor and its creditors, even in bankruptcy or other
receivership.
b) The transferee has the right to pledge or exchange the transferred assets.
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c) The transferor does not maintain effective control over the transferred assets.
SFAS 140 provides that, if these three criteria are met, the transaction should be accounted
for as a sale. If any criterion is not met, then the transaction should be accounted for as a
secured financing. As a general matter, most repo transactions satisfy subparagraph (b)
above but fail subparagraph (a) or (c), and are accounted for as financings (Herz 2010). (See
Appendix A for the complete text of SFAS 140, paragraph 9 and related paragraph 218.)

4. Lehman’s Interpretation of SFAS 140 and Repo 105
Shortly after SFAS 140 took effect in September 2000, Lehman developed a policy and
program explaining how the firm might benefit from the standard. Lehman made certain
favorable interpretations regarding the standard’s requirements for a “true sale” and
“effective control.” These interpretations allowed it to determine that repo transactions that
were overcollateralized by 5% (at a time when the standard haircut was 2%) would satisfy
the standard’s requirements and permit it to account for these transactions as sales, hence
the name Repo 105 (Lehman 2006A, Herz 2010).
Subparagraph 9(a)— True Sales
Subparagraph 9(a) of SFAS 140 provides that to characterize a repo transaction as a “sale”
the transferor must give up effective control of the assets. Further, the transferor is deemed
to have given up such effective control if the transferred assets have been “put presumptively
beyond the reach of the transferor and its creditors” or legally isolated from the transferor
even in the event of the transferor’s bankruptcy. This is usually established by a “true sale”
at law, and typically a company would secure an opinion from a law firm that the transaction
is a true sale to support its accounting characterization (Examiner’s Report, Vol. 3).
However, because the U.S. law on point was unsettled, Lehman was unable to find a U.S. law
firm that would provide a true sale opinion supporting its intended accounting of Repo 105
transactions as “sales” rather than “financings” under U.S. law.
English law on point, however, was more settled, and Lehman was able to secure a true sale
opinion from Linklaters, a major London law firm and main outside counsel to Lehman
Brothers, Inc. (Europe) (LBIE), Lehman’s U.K. broker-dealer subsidiary. The Linklaters’
opinion, however, was limited to the application of English law and stated that it was
intended for use only by LBIE (Linklaters 2006).
Despite these limitations, as stated in its Accounting Policy Manual, Lehman relied on the
Linklaters’ letter for all its firm-wide Repo 105 transactions: “Repos generally cannot be
treated as sales in the United States because lawyers cannot provide a true sale opinion
under U.S. law. . . The U.K. law firm of Linklaters has issued us true sale opinions covering
Repo 105 and Repo 108 transactions documented under a GMRA under English law”
(Lehman 2006A).
Subparagraph 9(c) ⎯Effective Control
Subparagraph 9(c) of SFAS 140 provides that in order to characterize a repo transaction as
a sale the transferor must relinquish effective control over the transferred assets. The
transferor is deemed to maintain effective control if it has the right and obligation to
repurchase the collateral. The transferor is deemed to have the right to repurchase the
collateral only if it receives adequate cash to “fund substantially all of the costs of
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repurchasing the same or substantially the same replacement assets” in the event of the
counterparty’s default.
The transferor does not receive adequate cash to fund repurchase of the collateral in
transactions where it receives cash equal to between 98 percent and 102 percent of the value
of the securities that it delivered as collateral. (SFAS 140, Paragraph 218). Thus, in such
transactions, the transferor retains effective control.
It should be noted that the 98% and 102% references were not intended to provide a brightline rule (Herz 2010). However, the standard also provides that “other collateral
arrangements typically fall well outside that guidance (i.e., that the transferor retains
effective control) (SFAS 140, Paragraph 218).
Therefore, even though SFAS 140 never discusses overcollateralization of 5%, Lehman
determined that by overcollateralizing repo transactions by 5%, it would receive adequate
cash to fund repurchasing the same, or substantially the same, replacement assets and
therefore could be viewed as having relinquished effective control of such collateral rendering
the repo transactions sales under. The Lehman Accounting Policy Manual explains it thus:
“If we can fund substantially all of the cost of purchasing the same or substantially
the same replacement assets, we are viewed as having the means to replace the
assets, even if the transferee defaults, and we are considered not to have relinquished
control of the assets. For purposes of this requirement, we have retained control of
the transferred assets if a fixed income security is margined at less than 105% of the
cash received. . . Transfers in which we transfer fixed-income securities valued at a
minimum of 105% of the cash received are considered to be sales with a forward
agreement to repurchase the securities rather than secured financing transactions”
(Lehman 2006A).
Based on this interpretation of SFAS 140 and the Linklaters’ opinion, each quarter, Lehman’s
U.S. affiliates transferred billions of dollars of assets to its London affiliate, LBIE, for the sole
purpose of entering into Repo 105 transactions with other European entities, enabling
Lehman to treat the transactions as “sales” rather than “financings.” Because Lehman
reported its financials on a consolidated worldwide basis, the location of the transactions
was largely benign for accounting purposes as they rolled up into the global results reported
by the U.S. parent company.
Despite the different treatment, Lehman’s Repo 105 transactions were strikingly similar to
its standard repo transactions, which it accounted for as secured financings. They utilized
the same documentation, employed similar types of securities as collateral, and involved
similar counterparties. Figure 2 illustrates the simplified structure of the two types of repos.
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Figure 2: LBIE Repo 105 Flow Diagram

Source: Examiner’s Report, Vol. 3, 788.

Lehman’s inability to secure a U.S. legal opinion complicated matters somewhat by requiring
it to structure Repo 105s through LBIE, its U.K. broker-dealer. Figure 3 shows the
intracompany and external elements of a Lehman Repo 105.
Figure 3: Lehman’s Complete Repo 105 Structure

LBHI= Lehman Brothers Holding Inc., LBIE= Lehman Brothers International (Europe), LBSF=Lehman Brothers
Special Finance
Source: Examiner’s Report, Vol. 3, 790.

As the Examiner’s Report noted:
In short, Lehman undertook transactions in a foreign jurisdiction (the United
Kingdom) that purported to comply with SFAS 140, where Lehman was unable to
obtain a SFAS 140 true-sale opinion from a United States law firm, and Lehman then
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relied upon the non-United States-based Lehman entity to ensure that the transaction
complied with United States GAAP” (Examiner’s Report, Vol. 3).
Limits Established
The 1x Leverage Rule. As part of its internal controls structure, Lehman senior management
also established limits on the total amount by which the firm could reduce its balance sheet
on any given day by using Repo 105 transactions. As of July 2006, this limit was set at “1x
leverage” for Repo 105, or $17 billion. To this was added an additional $5 billion, permitted
for similar Repo 1085 transactions, for a combined total of $22 billion (Examiner’s Report,
vol. 3). This combined firm-wide total on Repo105/108 transactions was increased to $25
billion as of January 2008 (Ibid.).
During 2006, Lehman’s use of Repo 105 stayed within or very close to its established limit.
However, beginning in 2007, the firm’s use escalated and then consistently exceeded the
established $25 billion limit in every quarter. In each of the first and second quarters of 2008,
Lehman exceeded these limits by approximately 100%, employing a combined total of
$49.102 billion and $50.383 billion, respectively (Ibid.).
The 80/20 Rule and the 120% Rule. In addition to the firm-wide cap on total Repo 105 usage,
management created two additional rules. First, the “80/20” or “continual use” rule specified
that the firm should maintain a minimal level of continual use of Repo 105 transactions
throughout the quarter. Apparently, this was intended to ensure that the amount of Repo
105s outstanding at any time was 80% of the amount outstanding at month-end. The second
rule, the 120% rule, prescribed that the maximum volume of Repo 105 transactions at
quarter-end should not exceed 120% of the average daily usage during the month. Lehman
financial executives described the purpose of these rules as “to make sure there was a
legitimate business purpose” for Repo 105 transactions (Examiner’s Report, Vol. 3).
However, the rules were consistently disregarded by Lehman, which would not have been
able to meet its balance sheet targets without its aggressive use of Repo 105 at the higher
levels (Ibid.).
Accounting Treatment
The reason that Lehman would choose to employ Repo 105 transactions rather than
standard repo transactions lies in the different accounting associated with these
transactions and the differing impact that they had on its balance sheet and financial
measures. As an example, assume that Lehman has on its balance sheet an asset (securities)
worth $105 million, a purchase it financed with $105 million of unsecured commercial
paper. The simple accounting treatment of this transaction would be:
Assets

Liabilities

+ $105M in securities

+ $105M commercial paper

The purchase of this security results in a net increase of $105M in both assets and liabilities.
Alternatively, suppose that the transaction was financed with repo. For simplicity, at this
stage we assume a zero “haircut” on this collateral, so Lehman is able to borrow the full $105
_____________________________________________________________________
Repo 108 transactions were similar to Repo 105s but utilized equity rather than debt securities as collateral
and an 8% haircut. Lehman also treated Repo 108s as sales. Their volume, however, never rose to more than a
fraction of that of Repo 105s.
5
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million. On the balance sheet, the transaction would be booked as a $105 million asset
(designated as “encumbered” by the repo), and a $105 million liability for the payment
required by the repurchase leg.
Assets

Liabilities
+ $105M repo loan

+ $105M in securities
(encumbered)

Once again, the accounting treatment would leave Lehman with an increase of $105M for
both assets and liabilities. Contractually, the transaction would have been documented as a
sale to the third party with Lehman obligated to repurchase the securities when it repays the
loan. However, because of this repurchase obligation and the fact that Lehman retains
certain rights of ownership (such as any coupon rights), under the accounting rules, the
transaction is treated as a “secured financing” not a true sale, and the securities remain on
Lehman’s books as an encumbered asset.
To make this case more realistic, we add a haircut to the repo loan. For example, if the lender
had some concerns about the borrower’s ability to repay or about the future value of the
collateral conditional on default, it would be prudent to lend something less than $105
million today. For example, if a lender is only willing to provide $103 million, then Lehman
would need to find $2 million of cash from somewhere else. The accounting treatment of this
transaction would be as follows:
Assets
+ $105M in securities
(encumbered)
- $2M in cash

Liabilities
+ $103 repo loan

For a net increase of $103 million on both sides of the balance sheet.
So why would Lehman utilize Repo 105 transactions in which it would be able to borrow
only $100 million against the securities worth $105 million? Lehman was under pressure to
reduce its balance sheet and its leverage. It concluded that, unlike standard repos, SFAS 140
would permit it to treat Repo 105 transactions as true sales of the underlying securities, not
just a pledge of them as security for the loan. Thus, it could account for the transaction as a
“sale” with a forward purchase commitment, and the securities underlying Repo 105
transactions could be removed from the balance sheet. Under this accounting treatment, the
balance sheet would look like this:
Assets
- $5M in cash
+$5M derivative

Liabilities
NOTHING

The securities and the repo loan do not appear anywhere, and the total assets and liabilities
are unchanged. Instead, it is as though the securities were purchased for $105 million, sold
for $100 million (hence the cash reduction of $5 million), with an offsetting derivative,
representing the value of the option to repurchase a $105 million asset at $100 million.
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The main disadvantage of Repo 105 compared to a standard repo is that Lehman must come
up with more cash for the original transaction. That liquidity would not be free. But the
advantage of Repo 105 is that the resulting balance sheet looks smaller. Whenever Lehman
moved a transaction from standard repo to Repo 105, the liabilities on the balance sheet
would fall by the size of the transaction with no effect on measured equity. Thus, balance
sheet leverage would be smaller.
As shown in Figure 4, there are several advantages to Repo 105 including that the cash
received for the Repo 105 is not booked as an increase in borrowings and that the cash may
be used to pay down other liabilities. 6
Figure 4: Lehman’s Accounting Treatment of Repo Transactions
Type of Transaction
Standard Repo

Repo 105

Impact on
balance
sheet

The transferred securities inventory
remained on Lehman’s balance sheet
during the term of the repo, leaving the
balance sheet unchanged.

The transferred securities inventory was
considered sold and was removed from
Lehman’s balance sheet during the term of the
repo, decreasing the balance sheet. It
recorded the cash it received in exchange for
the collateral as proceeds from a sale.

Impact on
total assets

Because the inventory remained on
Lehman’s balance sheet, the borrowed cash
increased Lehman’s total assets.

Although Lehman’s inventory decreased,
Lehman’s total assets remained unchanged.

Impact on
total
borrowings

The cash received was booked as an
increase in borrowings.

The cash received was not booked as an
increase in borrowings.

Impact on
total
liabilities

Lehman recorded a corresponding liability
representing its obligation to repay the
borrowed cash, which increased its
liabilities.

Lehman did not record a liability representing
its obligation to repay the borrowed funds
even though the economic substance of the
transaction was a borrowing, and thus,
Lehman’s total liabilities did not increase.

No impact on leverage because the income
is offset.

Lehman used the borrowed funds from Repo
105 transactions to pay down other short‐
term liabilities. By doing so, Lehman reduced
its total assets, thereby reducing its leverage
ratios.

Impact on
leverage
ratios

Source: Examiner’s Report, Vol.3, 768-775.

5. Lehman’s Use of Repo 105
From 2001 through 2006, Lehman regularly engaged in standard repo and Repo 105
transactions in varying volumes, usually less than $20 billion per month. By July 2006,
Lehman personnel believed that at least two, and possibly three, of its five investment bank
_____________________________________________________________________
6 Caplan et. al. (2012) provides additional analysis and discussion of Lehman’s use of Repo 105 from an
accounting perspective. Also see the Examiner’s Report, Vol. 3 for an Executive Summary of the Repo 105 issue.
Pages 750-760 of the Examiner’s Report provide several detailed examples comparing the accounting
treatment of standard repos to that of Repo 105 transactions.
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peers had ceased using Repo 105s (Lehman 2006B). By 2008, Lehman personnel believed
that all its peer banks had ceased using the transaction (Examiner’s Report, Vol. 3).
By mid-2007, real estate markets were beginning to show signs of weakening. Credit rating
agencies and industry analysts began to scrutinize the investment banks, paying particular
attention to their liquidity and reliance on wholesale funding. The banks were pressured to
lower their leverage. In January 2008, CEO Dick Fuld instituted a deleveraging strategy at
Lehman and appointed Bart McDade as “balance sheet czar” to oversee the company’s
efforts. Senior Lehman management at all levels was “critically focused” on reducing
Lehman’s firm-wide leverage (Examiner’s Report, Vol. 3).
Lehman could reduce leverage by (1) raising equity or (2) reducing its net assets. Because
there was a negative “perception issue” with raising equity, Lehman sought to reduce its net
assets. However, reducing net assets through outright sales was tricky for Lehman, given its
high concentration of real-estate-related assets, which were becoming difficult to sell and
which had experienced downward valuation pressure. The sale of many of its “sticky”
inventory positions at “fire-sale prices” would result in substantial losses that Lehman would
have to recognize and would also generate additional questions regarding the valuation of
similar assets that remained on Lehman’s balance sheet (Ibid.). An additional complication
was that Lehman was unable to utilize its sticky assets in its Repo 105 transactions as lenders
would not accept them.
As shown in Figure 5, Lehman consistently utilized Repo 105 (and to a lesser degree Repo
108) during 2006-2008. Beginning in the second quarter of 2007, however, Lehman
noticeably increased its use of Repo 105s, utilizing a high of $31.94 billion during the quarter,
up from $27.28 billion the prior quarter. Each subsequent quarter, it utilized higher amounts.
Figure 5: Total Repo 105/108 at Quarter‐End 2006-2008 (in $billions)*
Period

2006
Q3

Q4

2007
Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

2008
Q1

Q2

Repo 105

n/a

$19.213

$20.578

$23.054

$29.054

$29.727

$42.200

$44.536

Repo 108

n/a

$5.091

$6.400

$8.575

$6.863

$8.854

$6.902

$5.847

$27.153

$24.519

$27.284

$31.943

$36.407

$38.634

$49.102

$50.383

Total

Limit
$22.000
$22.000
$22.000
$25.000
$25.000
$25.000
$25.000
$25.000
For purposes of this chart: (i) Repo 105 amount refers to the total volume of Repo 105 transactions
undertaken by the Fixed Income Division, (ii), Repo 108 amount refers to the total volume of Repo 108
transactions undertaken by the Equities Division, and (iii) Total Repo 105/108 amount may be greater than
the sum of Repo 105 and Repo 108 volumes reported in this chart due to intermittent and de minimus
amounts of Rep 105 transactions undertaken by other Lehman divisions or groups.
Source: Examiner’s Report, Vol. 3, 891

Moreover, as shown in Figure 6, Lehman’s usage spiked at quarter-end when it had to
publicly report its financial results. As of February 2007, the firm-wide cap on Repo 105
transactions was $25 billion, where it remained. Lehman exceeded this cap by approximately
$25 billion in each of the first and second quarters of 2008, temporarily removing $49.1
billion and $50.4 billion, respectively, in securities inventory from its balance sheet at
quarter-end (Examiner’s Report, Vol. 3). And it did this even though in its public disclosures
and other pronouncements, it spoke of its internal controls and limits as real limitations on
its operations contributing to its financial stability and integrity.
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Figure 6: Monthly Repo 105 Usage (in $billions)

Note: The amounts shown above in fact correspond to the combined totals of Repo 105 and Repo 108 transactions
as shown in Figure 5.
Source: Derived from Examiner’s Report, Vol. 3, 875.

The Impact of Repo 105 Transactions on Lehman’s Net Leverage and Balance Sheet
The effect of Lehman’s escalated Repo 105 usage was to reduce its balance sheet and its
reported net leverage ratio. Days after quarter-end, Lehman would borrow billions of dollars
to repurchase the securities given as collateral and take them back onto its balance sheet.
Small shifts in net leverage ratios can have a material effect on how an investment bank’s
financial stability is viewed. Audit guidance prepared by Lehman’s outside auditor, Ernst &
Young, regarding the process for reopening or adjusting a closed balance sheet stated,
“Materiality is usually defined as any item individually, or in the aggregate, that moves net
leverage by 0.1 or more (typically $1.8 billion).” As Figure 7 shows, Lehman’s use of Repo
105 “moved its net leverage ratio not by tenths, but by whole points” (Examiner’s Report,
Vol. 3). As a result, Valukas concluded that, by using Repo 105 so aggressively, Lehman was
able to report leverage ratios materially lower than it would have had to report had it not
done so.
Valukas also found that Lehman’s use of Repo 105 transactions had a material impact on its
financial results and should have been disclosed in its SEC reporting, which it was not, as
discussed below in Section 6, Lehman’s Disclosure Obligations. Lehman also did not disclose
the full extent of its Repo 105 use and impact to its board of directors. And Lehman continued
to use Repo 105 transactions even though it was a widely held belief among Lehman
employees that other banks to which it was being compared by regulators, rating agencies,
and the investing public no longer used these transactions. (See Examiner’s Report, Vol. 3,
800-53, Managing the Balance Sheet and Leverage, and 884-914, The Materiality of Repo
105.)
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Figure 7: Lehman’s Reported Net Leverage vs. Net Leverage Without Repo 105
Date

Repo 105 Usage

Reported Net
Leverage

Net Leverage
Without Repo 105

Difference

Q4 2007

$38.6 B

16.1

17.8

1.7

Q1 2008

$49.1 B

15.4

17.3

1.9

Q2 2008

$50.4 B

12.1

13.9

1.8

Source: Examiner’s Report, Vol. 3, 748 (Footnotes omitted).

6. Lehman’s Disclosure Obligations
Required SEC Disclosure
As a publicly traded company Lehman was regulated by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and required to make periodic reports on Form 10-K (annual) and Form
10-Q (quarterly), as well as certain episodic disclosures. SEC rules also governed what
Lehman said in its earnings calls with analysts. Lehman’s disclosures in its filings and
earnings calls were required to be full, fair, accurate, and not misleading. Statements are
considered not misleading if they present material information that an investor would
consider important to making a decision and do not omit any material information.
Information is material if a reasonable person would likely consider it important.
Moreover, Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of
Operations (MD&A) is an integral part of a corporation’s annual and periodic SEC reports. A
company is specifically required to discuss in its MD&A known trends and uncertainties
related to its liquidity and cash flow, capital resources, and results of operations, as well as
unusual and infrequent events and transactions that could have a material favorable or
unfavorable impact on the company (SEC Item 303).
Lehman’s Reports
Repo 105 transactions enabled Lehman to remove up to $50 billion of assets from its balance
sheet for short periods of time and to pay unrelated debts, thereby temporarily reducing its
reported assets and net leverage ratio at quarter-end. From 2000 through 2007, Lehman
prepared its Forms 10-K and 10-Q reports in accordance with generally accepted accounting
principles (GAAP) and affirmatively stated therein that it sometimes used repos as a means
of short-term borrowings and that it accounted for them as “financings.” “At no time did
Lehman disclose in any of its Forms 10-K or 10-Q, directly or indirectly, from 2000 through
third quarter 2007, its use of Repo 105s or that it accounted for any of its repo transactions
as "sales" pursuant to SFAS 140” (Examiner’s Report, Vol. 3).
Because it accounted for its Repo 105 transactions as sales rather than borrowings, Lehman
did not disclose its liabilities arising from the obligation to repay the borrowings. An investor
reading its SEC reports would not learn that it had borrowed tens of billions of dollars and
that, a few days after the close of the quarter, it would have to repay these amounts to buy
back the assets given as collateral (Ibid.). For these reasons, the examiner found that
Lehman’s MD&A statements about its liquidity and liabilities (i.e., obligation to repurchase
the securities) were deficient and misleading (Ibid.). (See Lehman's 2007 Form 10-K, page
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97, for its disclosure regarding repos and Item 303 of Reg. S-K regarding required MD & A
disclosures.)
Additionally, from late 2007 through mid- 2008, at its quarterly earnings conference calls,
Lehman officers touted its reduced net leverage as evidence of its discipline and financial
health. At no time, however, did Lehman disclose in its filed reports or on these calls that
Repo 105 was a major driver of the reduction. When questioned, Lehman officers indicated
that the reduction was due to the sale of assets but said nothing about the firm’s use of Repo
105. (Examiner’s Report, Vol. 3).
The bankruptcy examiner found that there existed sufficient evidence from which a trier of
fact could conclude that Lehman’s reported net leverage ratio was materially misleading. He
also concluded that plausible legal claims existed against Lehman officers Dick Fuld, Erin
Callan, Ian Lowitt, and Christopher O’Meara “for causing and allowing Lehman to file periodic
reports that did not disclose Lehman’s use of Repo 105 transactions” (Ibid.).
In interviews conducted by the bankruptcy examiner, representatives from credit rating
agencies, the Federal Reserve, and the SEC all said that they would have wanted to know
about Lehman’s Repo 105 usage and that it would have been relevant to their analysis
((Ibid.). (See Ibid, 992-1027, on management’s culpability for Lehman’s Repo 105 use and
disclosure.)
Lehman’s failure to disclose its Repo 105 program also violated its internal code of ethics,
which provided in part:
It is crucial that all books of account, financial statements and records of the Firm
reflect the underlying transactions and any disposition of assets in a full, fair,
accurate, and timely manner. All employees and directors who are involved in the
Firm’s disclosure process are required to know and understand the disclosure
requirements applicable to the Firm that are within the scope of their responsibilities,
and must endeavor to ensure that information in documents that Lehman Brothers
files with or submits to the SEC, or otherwise discloses to the public, is presented in a
full, fair, accurate, timely, and understandable manner.
GAAP Disclosure
Lehman prepared its financial reports in accordance with GAAP and accounted for its Repo
105 transactions in accordance with SFAS 140, a GAAP standard. The financial reports were
reviewed by Ernst & Young, whose responsibility was to ensure GAAP compliance. Ernst &
Young never undertook an in-depth review of Lehman’s Repo 105 practice. Nor did it request
additional Repo 105 disclosure from Lehman.
In light of these facts, the bankruptcy examiner concluded that, while Lehman’s Repo 105
accounting may have technically complied with SFAS 140, the financial statements still may
have been misleading, and Ernst & Young may not have fulfilled its duty. This is because
GAAP requires more than mere technical compliance.7
_____________________________________________________________________
“Generally accepted accounting principles recognize the importance of reporting transactions and events in
accordance with their substance. The auditor should consider whether the substance of transactions or events
differs materially from their form” (AU § 411.06). Courts have ruled that strict application of FASB standards
does not ensure compliance with GAAP. See for example In re Global Crossing, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 322 F. Supp.2d
319, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) cited at Examiner’s Report, Vol. 3, 965 (“ultimate goals of fairness and accuracy in
reporting require more than mere technical compliance”).
7
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In reaching this conclusion, Valukas cited a prominent court decision, In re Global Crossing,
Ltd:
Similarly, as noted in In re Global Crossing Ltd. Securities Litigation, even if a
defendant established that its accounting practices “were in technical compliance
with certain individual GAAP provisions . . . this would not necessarily insulate it
from liability. This is because, unlike other regulatory systems, GAAP’s ultimate goals
of fairness and accuracy in reporting require more than mere technical compliance.”
The court explained that “when viewed as a whole,” GAAP has no “loopholes”
because its purpose, shared by the securities laws, is “to increase investor
confidence by ensuring transparency and accuracy in financial reporting.” Technical
compliance with specific accounting rules does not automatically lead to fairly
presented financial statements. “Fair presentation is the touchstone for determining
the adequacy of disclosure in financial statements. While adherence to generally
accepted accounting principles is a tool to help achieve that end, it is not necessarily
a guarantee of fairness. Moreover, registrants are “required to provide whatever
additional information would be necessary to make the statements in their financial
reports fair and accurate, and not misleading.” (Examiner’s Report, Vol. 3)
(Footnotes omitted).
Thus, Valukas also found that plausible legal claims existed against Ernst & Young for its
failure to meet professional standards in connection with Lehman’s failure to disclose Repo
105 in its financial statements (Ibid). (See Wiggins, et al. 2014D, which discusses in detail the
role of Ernst & Young.)

7. Additional Impacts and Risks to Lehman of Using Repo 105
It may be questioned whether Repo 105 was purely an accounting issue that had no impact
on the underlying economics of Lehman’s business. However, Repo 105 was accompanied
by real risks and costs, as discussed below.
Employee Dissent
Lehman accelerated its use of Repo 105 during 2007 and 2008 to reduce the risk of carrying
too much leverage. Since Repo 105 agreements accounted for as sales under SFAS 140
generally involved the same collateral and the same counterparties as standard repo
agreements accounted for as financings, Repo 105 was an expensive way to fund the firm’s
operations. Further, Anton R. Valukas, the Lehman bankruptcy examiner, concluded that
there was no business purpose for Lehman’s use of Repo 105 instead of standard repos. To
the contrary, he found significant evidence that it was well understood throughout the
company that the sole purpose for engaging in Repo 105 transactions was to manage the
balance sheet and leverage ratio (Examiner’s Report, Vol. 3).
Repo 105 usage was widespread and persistent throughout the firm; its characteristics were
transparent and known to a great number of employees, not all of whom agreed with its use.
Several employees spoke out against the practice, including Bart McDade, who, once he
became president in June 2008, began to implement a program to cut Lehman’s use of Repo
105 by 50 percent (Ibid.). The examiner’s report collected the following comments:
•
•

“[T]he firm has a function called repo 105 whereby you can repo a position for a week,
and it is regarded as a true sale to get rid of net balance sheet.”
“We have been using Repo 105 in the past to reduce balance sheet at the quarterend.”
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“. . . another drug we're on.”
“[A]n accounting gimmick.”
“[A] lazy way of managing the balance sheet, as opposed to legitimately meeting
balance sheet targets at quarter end.”
“Repo 105 offers a low-cost way to offset the balance sheet and leverage impact of
current market conditions.”
“It’s basically window dressing. We are calling repos true sales, based on legal
technicalities.”
“Can you imagine what this would be like without [Repo] 105?”

Ibid. (footnotes omitted).
The Whistleblower Letter
Mathew Lee, a 14-year employee and senior vice president in charge of Lehman’s global
balance sheet, was so distressed by practices at Lehman that he sent a letter dated May 18,
2008, to Lehman’s officers, alleging accounting mismanagement and citing a number of
concerns with how the balance sheet was being managed. Although the letter did not
explicitly reference Repo 105, Lee directly raised this issue with management and with Ernst
& Young, whom management asked to look into the matter, when interviewed by them. Even
though Lee had specifically mentioned Repo 105 as one of his concerns, neither Lehman
management nor Ernst & Young informed the Lehman board of the firm’s use of Repo 105
or that Lee had raised the topic as an issue. Lee was laid off shortly thereafter, and Lehman’s
aggressive use of Repo 105 continued. (See the Lee Whistleblower Letter and Wiggins et al.
2014D for further discussion of the whistleblower letter and management’s comments
regarding the same.)

8. The Regulatory Response to the Repo 105 Revelation
The revelation of Lehman’s use of Repo 105 in the Lehman bankruptcy examiner’s report
issued in March 2010, caused much debate about its accounting and disclosure. Accounting
professionals disagreed whether Lehman had complied with SFAS 140 or stretched a
loophole too far. Commenters also disagreed about Lehman’s duty to disclose its use of Repo
105.
The SEC Response
On September 17, 2010, the SEC issued Release No. 33-9143, which proposed requiring
companies to make additional disclosures about their short-term borrowing arrangements,
regardless of how such arrangements are accounted for. “Specifically, the proposals would
require a registrant to provide, in a separately captioned subsection of Management’s
Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations, a comprehensive
explanation of its short-term borrowings, including both quantitative and qualitative
information” (Ibid.). Although the proposed changes were not ultimately adopted, on
September 28, 2010, the SEC also issued interpretive Release No. 33-9144, which provided
guidance on existing disclosure requirements pertaining to presentation of liquidity and
capital resources.
Impact on Accounting Standards
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Lehman’s use of Repo 105 also highlighted the continuing debate between FASB standards,
which are rules-based, and international accounting standards, which are principles-based.
Rules-based standards such as SFAS 140 are generally thought to be more rigid and less
subject to varying interpretation than principles-based standards, but also to be subject to
greater manipulation. This difference was cited by David Tweedie, chair of the International
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) in commenting on Repo 105: “International Financial
Reporting Standards [IFRS] does [sic] not provide for so-called Repo 105 transactions. . . .We
don’t allow it. That’s why we have principles, not rules, so you can’t do it. They find ways to
get around rules” (Cohn, 2010). (See Bradbury and Schröder, 2012 for a discussion of the
principles versus rules debate.)
Under the relevant International Accounting Standard (IAS 39, Financial Instruments:
Recognition and Measurement), the consideration of a transferor’s ability to repurchase or
redeem financial assets transferred, even in the event of default by the transferee, is not
required in determining its accounting treatment. Notwithstanding Chairman Tweedie’s
declaration, on October 7, 2010, the IASB amended IFRS 7, Financial Instruments:
Disclosures to require additional disclosures if a disproportionate amount of financial asset
transfer transactions occur around the end of a reporting period.
Additionally, in 2011, the FASB updated SFAS 140 to specifically delete the borrower’s ability
to repurchase collateral as a criterion for determining whether effective control is retained.8
Because IAS 39 did not require consideration of a transferor’s ability to repurchase or
redeem financial assets transferred, the change to SFAS 140 brings the two standards into
greater alignment (FASB 2011). (Pounder 2011 further discusses the different ways in which
various agencies have responded.)
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Appendix A: Selected Paragraphs from SFAS 140
Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets, Paragraph 9:
9. A transfer of financial assets (or all or a portion of a financial asset) in which the transferor
surrenders control over those financial assets shall be accounted for as a sale to the extent
that consideration other than beneficial interests in the transferred assets is received in
exchange. The transferor has surrendered control over transferred assets if and only if all of
the following conditions are met:
a. The transferred assets have been isolated from the transferor—put presumptively beyond
the reach of the transferor and its creditors, even in bankruptcy or other receivership
(paragraphs 27 and 28).
b. Each transferee (or, if the transferee is a qualifying SPE (paragraph 35), each holder of its
beneficial interests) has the right to pledge or exchange the assets (or beneficial interests) it
received, and no condition both constrains the transferee (or holder) from taking advantage
of its right to pledge or exchange and provides more than a trivial benefit to the transferor
(paragraphs 29−34).
c. The transferor does not maintain effective control over the transferred assets through
either (1) an agreement that both entitles and obligates the transferor to repurchase or
redeem them before their maturity (paragraphs 47−49) or (2) the ability to unilaterally
cause the holder to return specific assets, other than through a cleanup call (paragraphs
50−54).”
The Importance of the Right and Obligation to Repurchase, Collateral and Symmetry,
Paragraph 218:
218. The Board also decided that the transferor's right to repurchase is not assured unless it
is protected by obtaining collateral sufficient to fund substantially all of the cost of
purchasing identical replacement securities during the term of the contract so that it has
received the means to replace the assets even if the transferee defaults. Judgment is needed
to interpret the term substantially all and other aspects of the criterion that the terms of a
repurchase agreement do not maintain effective control over the transferred asset. However,
arrangements to repurchase or lend readily obtainable securities, typically with as much as
98% collateralization (for entities agreeing to repurchase) or as little as 102%
overcollateralization (for securities lenders), valued daily and adjusted up or down
frequently for changes in the market price of the security transferred and with clear powers
to use that collateral quickly in the event of default, typically fall clearly within that guideline.
The Board believes that other collateral arrangements typically fall well outside that
guideline.
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